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Hidden within the 2,300-page Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act are two sections (1502 and 1504) aimed not at preventing another financial meltdown 
but, rather, at fostering transparency about commercial activities in foreign countries. In 
2010, CGD awarded its Commitment to Development Award to Publish What You Pay in 
recognition of the role it played in passing Section 1504 of the bill, which requires 
companies listed on U.S. stock markets to disclose payments to foreign governments. 
Section 1504 was hailed as a historic victory for the transparency agenda, and an important 
tool to help citizens hold their governments accountable. Section 1502, on the other hand, 
requires publicly traded companies to report to the SEC whether they source conflict 
minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or its neighbors. It is much 
more controversial. 
In this paper commissioned by CGD, Laura Seay, assistant professor of political science at 
Morehouse College and specialist on the DRC, analyzes 1502 and its effects—even before 
the rules are implemented. She argues that this well-intentioned but ultimately misguided 
provision has already had unintended consequences that hurt those it is supposed to help.  
Aimed at curbing the flow of revenues that fuel conflict, 1502 has led to a de facto boycott 
on Congolese minerals given uncertainty over regulation and the impossibility of tracing 
certain minerals such as gold. The result: millions of artisanal miners are out of work, and 
the livelihood of millions more put at risk without any significant connection to a reduction 
in the violence. 
Seay explores what went wrong and argues that the initiative was based on misperceptions 
about the relationship between mineral exploitation and conflict in the Congo, the nature of 
the conflict, and the feasibility of traceability schemes in such an environment. Seay 
demonstrates the need to reassess this policy with a more careful understanding of the 
dynamics on the ground. This is especially critical as the SEC determines if the provision is 
implementable and governments in Europe consider similar legislation. 
Todd Moss 
Center for Global Development 
    
 
Executive Summary 
Although its provisions have yet to be implemented, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is already having a profound effect on the 
Congolese mining sector.  Nicknamed “Obama’s Law” by the Congolese, section 1502 has 
created a de facto ban on Congolese mineral exports, put anywhere from tens of thousands up 
to 2 million Congolese miners out of work in the eastern Congo, and, despite ending most 
of the trade in Congolese conflict minerals, done little to improve the security situation or 
the daily lives of most Congolese.  In this report, I trace the development of section 1502 
with respect to the pursuit of a conflict minerals-based strategy by U.S. advocates, examine 
the effects of the legislation, and recommend new courses of action to move forward in a 
way that both promotes accountability and transparency and allows Congolese artisanal 
miners to earn a living. 
Recommendations 
1.  Implement Dodd-Frank section 1502 in phases with clear annual benchmarks 
over three years.  In order to eliminate confusion about competing traceability 
schemes and to allow corporations time to establish realistic, workable procedures, 
section 1502 should be implemented slowly and in stages.  Emphasis should be 
placed on a consensus-building process and improving buy-in for participation in 
traceability schemes in Congolese mining communities.   
2.  Provide immediate assistance to affected mining communities.  Humanitarian 
assistance should immediately be provided to miners and their families who have 
lost reliable sources of income as a result of the de facto ban on the Congolese 
mineral trade.  In particular, donors should assist miners’ families with short-term 
education and health care expenses.   
3.  Turn traceability into a jobs program. The international community should work 
with local actors to improve economic livelihoods opportunities for Congolese 
miners.  Particular efforts should be focused on hiring former miners to work for 
traceability schemes and on developing alternative livelihood opportunities beyond 
subsistence agriculture. 
4.  Create formal mechanisms for Congolese leadership in the implementation 
process. In order to find practical and realistic ways of combating the conflict 
minerals problem, a wide spectrum of Congolese civil society leaders should be at 
the forefront of traceability scheme implementation processes as well as efforts to 
improve regional security.  The international community should create mechanisms 
by which all voices – including dissenting ones – can be heard and compromises can 
be reached.  
 
5.  Focus on security sector reform as a distinct issue.  Given the lack of 
governance and state control in eastern D.R. Congo, as well as armed groups’ access 
to a wide variety of revenue sources, improving mineral traceability in the region is 
highly unlikely to improve the security situation.  Policy makers should focus 
separately on security sector reform and work to protect civilians independently of 
the conflict minerals issue. 
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The ongoing crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where up to 6 million 
excess deaths have been recorded since 1998 and government neither controls nor governs 
its territory in a meaningful sense, is cause for concern to the international community and 
the United States government.  The D.R. Congo is home to more than 60 million people 
who have suffered profoundly as a result of their state’s collapse and a series of local, 
national, and international conflicts that began in the early 1990’s and some of which 
continue until today.  In the aftermath of the contentious and contested November 2011 
elections, DRC’s future stability and ability to develop are both in question.  In the United 
States, the issue of conflict minerals has become one of the dominant narratives about the 
crisis.  As Autesserre notes, however, the overwhelming focus on conflict minerals as a cause 
of conflict in the D.R. Congo has perverse consequences that actually prevent international 
and local actors from developing a comprehensive solution to the country’s conflicts.1  
Moreover, Western advocacy efforts on conflict minerals have thus far made life more 
difficult for many Congolese while failing to stop the violence they purport to address.  
Instead, these efforts have thus far increased smuggling,2 led armed groups to seek other 
sources of revenue, and left up to 2 million Congolese artisanal miners out of work.  As is 
the case with the Kimberley Process, good intentions and the belief that attacking the 
perceived economic roots of conflict was a path to peace have largely proved ineffective.   
In this paper, I seek to explain why efforts to create a mineral supply chain tracing scheme 
have thus far failed to improve the D.R. Congo’s security situation, and why these efforts are 
unlikely to lead to peace in the future.  I begin by providing brief background on the mineral 
sector in the D.R. Congo and then turn to a discussion of recent advocacy efforts relating to 
the region.  Following that, I then turn to a discussion of the creation of legislation that 
became Dodd-Frank Sections 1502 and 1504 and the effects this legislation has had since its 
passage in July 2010.  I debate the decision to pursue “conflict minerals” as a means by 
which to make progress on improving Congolese security, and criticize advocates for 
misunderstanding the relationship between conflict and the local economy.  Finally, I 
conclude with a summary of the debate over the Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations that are to be issued under section 1502 and make policy recommendations for 
moving forward in a way that can satisfy the advocacy community, industry, and those who 
care about responsible supply chain sourcing while allowing Congolese artisanal miners to 
work and provide for their families and moving toward a more transparent, accountable, and 
legitimate mining sector in the eastern D.R. Congo. 
                                                       
1 Séverine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended 
Consequences.” African Affairs (Forthcoming 2012). 
2 Jonny Hogg and Graham Holliday, “Conflict minerals crackdown backfiring in Congo.” Reuters (30 
December 2011). Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL6E7NU25720111230?sp=true  
 
Background: The Mineral Trade in the Eastern D.R. Congo 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the richest sources of natural resources on 
Earth.  Contained within the country’s borders and territorial waters are oil, gold, rubber, 
cobalt, copper, uranium, diamonds, tantalum, cassiterite, wolframite, and countless other 
mineral resources.  Abundant natural resources are found throughout Congolese territory, 
but particular minerals are highly concentrated in certain areas.  Katanga province, in 
southeastern D.R. Congo, is home to high concentrations of cobalt, copper, uranium, and 
tin, while much of the region’s gold is found in the northeastern Orientale province 
(particularly in Ituri district) and the northern reaches of north Kivu.  Diamonds are largely 
located in the central Kasai provinces, while the eastern North and South Kivu provinces 
have high concentrations of tin, cassiterite, tungsten, and tantalum.   
The D.R. Congo’s natural resources have always been a draw for outsiders looking for 
wealth in the vast territory.  Belgian colonialism was intimately tied to rubber extraction and 
used brutal methods to force the Congolese to gather it.  American scientists used Uranium-
235 from Katanga in the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima to end World 
War II, and Cold War-era policy makers overlooked dictator Mobutu Sese Seko’s excesses 
and corruption to ensure that they could maintain access to uranium and other essential 
minerals.   
Congolese minerals again drew global attention in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s as world 
prices for tantalum skyrocketed.   Tantalum, a mineral that is a key component in many 
consumer electronics, was in high demand as consumer demand for mobile phones and 
gaming systems.  Tantalum is found in the D.R. Congo in the form of coltan (columbite-
tantalite) and armed groups, including the armies of Rwanda and Uganda, quickly realized 
that they could profit from the extraction of tantalum and other regional minerals.  
However, it is important to note that mineral extraction was neither the cause nor root of 
violence in the Kivu provinces or Ituri.  As anthropologist Stephen Jackson noted in 2003, 
“The present war in the DRC did not begin with explicitly economic objectives. Rather, as 
the war reached a stalemate nationally, so belligerents turned inwards to the territory they 
controlled, capitalising – personally as well as collectively – on the rich resources available. 
Coltan both finances violence and provides an incentive for it.”3 
D.R. Congo’s role as a supplier of coltan to international markets has been repeatedly and 
erroneously overstated, as documented by Michael Nest.  A series of incorrect and 
misinterpreted assertions led to the oft-repeated claim that Congo is home to “80% of the 
world’s coltan reserves,” or “supplies,” yet there is no basis of truth to either of these claims.  
As Nest notes, we do not actually know how much tantalum is in the D.R. Congo, but “The 
most informed estimate is that Central Africa has around 9% per cent of the global reserves. 
                                                       
3 Stephen Jackson, “Fortunes of war: the coltan trade in the Kivus” in Sarah Collinson, ed. Power, Livelihoods, 
and Conflict:  Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action. Overseas Development Institute 
Humanitarian Policy Group (2003), 21-36.   
 
The DRC’s reserves are the major component of these – perhaps 7 to 8 per cent of global 
reserves.”4  Thus the importance of Congolese minerals in global supply chains for coltan is 
not as large as many have claimed.  Its importance to the Congolese economy is still very 
significant. 
There is no question that some Congolese and foreign armed groups fought for control of 
the mineral trade in eastern D.R. Congo, nor is there a question that some groups engaged in 
mining also engage in civilian-directed violence.  The United Nations Group of Experts on 
the Democratic Republic of Congo have done excellent work documenting the ways that the 
mineral trade finances violent armed groups in the eastern Congo.5  However, not all 
violence in the eastern D.R. Congo is related to the mineral trade, and not all mines are 
controlled by violent actors.  Moreover, the eastern Congolese economy is largely dependent 
on mineral trade, whether linked to violence or not.  As Jackson notes, “tantalum mining has 
become a critical mode of survival for many at the grassroots.”6  In many families, mining 
activity is generational and represents their only potential economic livelihood.7   
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the mining sector to the Congolese economy.  
As Goma’s Pole Institute Research Director Aloys Tegera notes, it “accounts for 80% of the 
exports, 72% of the national budget and 28% of GDP according to the latest available 
statistics. Its output and sales are of major importance for the economy. Also other 
economic sectors, for example the agricultural sector, are influenced by the mining sector. 
Locally, everybody depends on mining!”8 
Congo Advocacy and the Mineral Trade 
Prior to the late 2000’s, there was little advocacy attention on the situation in the eastern 
Congo.  During the war, journalists had actively covered the region, but from about 2002 on, 
most international attention focused on the growing crisis in Darfur.  While a few newspaper 
articles on the Congo situation appeared from time to time and the International Crisis 
Group and several non-governmental organizations released regular reports on the crisis, 
there was no grassroots constituency centered around drawing attention to or effecting 
change in the D.R. Congo.   
                                                       
4 Michael Nest, Coltan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 18. 
5 Reports of the Group of Experts Submitted through the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Available: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml 
6 Stephen Jackson, “Making a Killing: Criminality and Coping in the Kivu War Economy.” Review of African 
Political Economy 93:94 (September 2002), 516-536.  
7 Sara Geenen, “Constraints, opportunities, and hope: which future for gold miners and traders in 
Kamituga, South Kivu?” in An Ansoms and Stefaan Marysse, eds., Natural Resources and Local Livelihoods in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa (New York: Palgrave, 2011). 
8 Aloys Tegera.  Quoted in “Report of Roundtable on Conflict Minerals Legislation.” makeITfair Campaign 
(11 July 2011). Available: http://makeitfair.org/the-facts/reports/roundtable-on-conflict-minerals-legislation  
 
That changed in 2007 with the launch of the Enough Project, which was created with the 
primary purpose of developing an American constituency around ending and preventing 
conflict in Africa.  Enough’s early advocacy on the D.R. Congo focused on the horrific 
nature of civilian-directed violence and the need for increased civilian protection efforts.  
Their 2007 and 2009 reports and activist briefs emphasized the complex nature of the 
violence there and the need for multi-pronged approaches to crisis resolution.9  These 
documents contained little or no mention of the mineral issue.  They also did little to build a 
grassroots constituency engaged on Congo in the United States.    
Enough’s focus shifted dramatically in April 2009 with the release of their “Can You Hear 
Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the World” 
strategy paper in which Enough founder John Prendergast directly linked Western 
consumers’ ownership of electronics like cell phones to sexual and other forms of violence 
in the eastern D.R. Congo.10  The paper laid out a strategy for engaging Western consumers 
on the Congo by pressuring electronics companies and government to avoid using minerals 
tied to conflict in consumer electronics.  It formed the basis for Enough and other advocacy 
organizations’ activities relating for the D.R. Congo from 2009 until today.  It is important to 
understand that the shift to a focus on conflict minerals galvanized grassroots activists on 
Congo and built a broad constituency around the situation in the eastern Congo.  The 
activists’ use of consumer electronics, particularly mobile phones, as a means of tying 
consumers to the crisis in the Congo was effective in making grassroots activists feel as 
though they had a connection to the crisis and could make a difference.  After the adoption 
of this strategy, advocacy groups proliferated, news coverage of the D.R. Congo increased 
dramatically, and donations poured in to organizations working on the region.   
Enough also pursued coalition relationships with several leading corporations.  The most 
responsive of these corporations was Hewlett Packard, which wished to be at the forefront 
of conflict minerals advocacy among multinational corporations.11  Enough gave high marks 
to HP, Motorola, Intel, Nokia, Microsoft, and Dell in their November 2010 rankings of 
companies making progress on conflict minerals.  It is safe to assume that most of those 
companies work closely with Enough on the issue as “Stakeholder Engagement” – defined 
                                                       
9 See, for example, “Averting the Nightmare Scenario.” Enough Project Activist Brief (10 September 2007). 
Available: http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/averting-nightmare-scenario-eastern-congo-activist-brief 
and Rebecca Feeley and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Getting Serious About Ending Conflict and Sexual Violence in 
Congo.” Enough Project Strategy Paper (19 March 2008).  Available: 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/getting-serious-about-ending-conflict-and-sexual-violence-congo.  
10 John Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual 
Violence in the World.” Enough Project strategy paper (April 2009). Available: 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/can-you-hear-congo-now-cell-phones-conflict-minerals-and-worst-
sexual-violence-world 
11 Hewlett Packard, DRAFT (07/23/10) Conflict Minerals Advocacy and 90-Day Action Plan (Internal document, 
2010).   
 
as working with an Enough-led coalition – is one of the indicators used to determine 
rankings.12 
The Road to Dodd-Frank Section 1502 
Enough and other activist groups working on D.R. Congo pursued a legislative strategy to 
pass a law that would require companies to be more transparent and accountable in their 
mineral sourcing practices.  Their efforts centered on House Resolution 4128, the Conflict 
Minerals Trade Act, the purpose of which was to: 
help stop the deadly conflict over minerals in eastern Congo by regulating the 
importation and trade of tin, tungsten and tantalum – minerals commonly used in 
cell phones, laptop computers and other popular electronic devices. Under the bill, 
U.S. Commerce Department-sanctioned auditors would audit mineral mines 
declaring them conflict free or not. These mines would be mapped to show which 
ones fund conflict. Furthermore, importers would have to certify whether they were 
importing conflict minerals – companies that do import conflict minerals will be 
reported to Congress by the United States Trade Representative.13 
HR 4128 was submitted by Representative James McDermott, Democrat of Washington 
State, and supported by the Center for American Progress (Enough’s parent organization), 
Human Rights Watch, Hewlett Packard, the International Labor Rights Forum, and the 
Information Technology Industry Council (ITIC, an industry lobby group).  Despite gaining 
broad support from several sectors and getting co-sponsorship from other legislators after 
pressure from grassroots activists, the bill never moved out of the committees to which it 
was referred.   
In July 2010, two provisions focusing on the D.R. Congo and conflict minerals were added 
to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  Section 1502 
requires publicly trading companies to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and on their websites whether they source conflict minerals, defined as “columbite-
tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives” from the D.R. Congo or 
its neighbors.14  It requires further reporting and auditing from companies that use D.R. 
Congo or neighboring country conflict minerals, and requires the SEC to create specific 
                                                       
12 Enough Project, Getting to Conflict Free: Assessing Corporate Action on Conflict Minerals. (December 
2010). Available: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/corporate_action-1.pdf 
13 OpenCongress Summary, HR 4128: Conflict Minerals Trade Act. Submitted to Congress 19 November 2009.  
Available: http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h4128/show 
14 Resource Consulting Services has an excellent explanation of the full implications of section 1502.  US 




regulations as to how companies will satisfy the legislation’s requirements.15   Section 1504 
requires increased transparency from companies registered with the SEC to disclose how 
much they pay foreign governments for access to minerals, oil, and gas.16  Section 1504 has 
been less controversial with respect to the DRC, though there is certainly contention over 
the measure in other circles.1718 
Consequences of Dodd-Frank 
Section 1502, however, has provoked a great deal of controversy as a number of unintended 
consequences have developed since its passage.  While the legislation gave the SEC 270 days 
to release rules on how companies are to report and audit their activities with respect to 
conflict minerals, meaning they should have been ready by April 2011, as of early January 
2012, the regulations have yet to be released.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its 
member companies are threatening to sue over the legislation because they believe that the 
SEC has not “show[n] any benefits to investors, increased efficiencies for the marketplace or 
capital formation.”19  In other words, the Chamber believes that the regulations impose too 
stiff a burden on commerce without demonstrating market-based reasons for doing so.   
As a result of this controversy, the SEC held a roundtable on conflict minerals on October 
18, 2011 in which corporations and advocacy community representatives were invited to 
participate. The meeting was somewhat contentious and featured a lively debate over the 
challenges corporations face in implementing section 1502’s potential rules.  Most of the 
corporations present at the roundtable asked the SEC to delay implementation of the rules 
due to the complexity and cost of implementation.20  For example, a representative of Kraft 
Foods noted at the meeting that verifying responsible sourcing with over 100,000 suppliers 
                                                       
15 “The ‘Conflict Minerals’ Provision in the Dodd-Frank Act Imposes New Disclosure Requirements on 
Manufacturers.”  McDermott Newsletters (22 July 2010). Available:  
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/13114620-b2dd-466a-8392-
e53e3da0a162.cfm 
16 US PWYP Law 2010 – Sec. 1504 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.  Revenue Watch Institute. (July 
2010) Available: http://resources.revenuewatch.org/en/official-document/us-pwyp-law-2010-sec-1504-dodd-
frank-wall-street-reform-act  
17 In particular, the petroleum industry.  See Ben Gemen, “Oil Industry presses SEC to keep company 
payment data locked up.” The Hill E2 Wire blog. (12 August 2011). Available: http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-
wire/e2-wire/176629-oil-industry-presses-sec-to-keep-company-payment-data-locked-up 
18 The relative lack of controversy over section 1504 with respect to D.R. Congo seems to have more to do 
with the overwhelming focus on 1502, which is where some in industry perceive a greater cost to disclosure..  
Also, D.R. Congo has relatively limited oil reserves, and many objections to 1504 thus far have come from the 
petroleum sector. 
19 Sarah N. Lynch, “U.S. SEC to hold round-table on conflict minerals.” Reuters. (29 September 2011). 
Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFS1E78S0R920110929?sp=true  
20 Emily Chasan, “Companies Urge SEC to Slow Down on Conflict Mineral Rule.” Wall Street Journal (18 
October 2011). Available: http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2011/10/18/companies-urge-sec-to-slow-down-on-
conflict-mineral-rule/  
 
for every product the company produces will be an enormous challenge.21  When the SEC 
does release regulations for section 1502, it is unclear both what they will be and whether the 
Chamber will file suit against the rules, which most observers believe would result in section 
1502 being thrown out by the courts.  The Western advocacy community has responded to 
these challenges with an almost universally united argument that section 1502 should be 
immediately implemented, and a grassroots campaign against the Chamber’s potential 
lawsuit is underway.   
The primary industry lobby, the Information Technology Industry Council, argues that while 
it is committed to improving transparency and accountability in the Congolese mineral 
sector, ultimately, the solution to Congo’s problems will not come from the private sector.  
Noted ITIC representative Rick Goss: 
ITI members are committed to responsible sourcing practices and supported a 
federal disclosure requirement on minerals obtained from the DRC.  Our companies 
have implemented a conflict-free smelter program and are working with global 
governments and civil society to jointly develop clean sourcing mechanisms to 
permit suppliers to remain economically engaged in the region.   
Ultimately, however, this terrible conflict is rooted in the wholesale absence of basic 
governance, security and accountability in the DRC, which allows age-old ethnic 
tensions and conflicts over land rights to rage unabated.  The DRC government and 
military are, at best, unable to protect their own citizens and, at worst, are reportedly 
complicit in committing atrocities against them.  While the private sector has a clear 
role to play, only the steadfast and coordinated engagement of global governments 
can address these primary causes and finally resolve the conflict.22 
Some involved in this debate believe that section 1502 should be scrapped and replaced with 
better legislation.  This may be unrealistic as getting Congressional attention on the issue a 
second time will be difficult if not impossible.  Others argue that amending 1502 to allow 
more time to implement SEC regulations and to improve outcomes for Congolese miners 
would be a more viable solution. 
Another problem is the cost of implementation.  An independent Tulane University 
economic impact assessment study commissioned by U.S. Senator Dick Durbin found that 
the cost of implementing section 1502 will be approximately $7.93 billion dollars – more 
than 100 times the SEC’s estimated cost of $71.2 million.  The authors of the study note that 
the discrepancy arises from a problem with the SEC estimate:  
                                                       
21 Jesse Hamilton, “Kraft, GE Officials Say Conflict-Mineral Rule will Burden Farms.” Bloomberg (18 
October 2011). Available: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-18/kraft-ge-officials-say-conflict-
mineral-rule-will-burden-firms.html 
22 Email correspondence with author.  13 October 2011.  
 
Our analysis shows that the published figure of $71.2 million by the SEC 
underestimates the implementation cost, in part because it does not take into 
account the range of actors affected by the statutory law.  In light of Section 1502, 
substantial traceability reforms would need to be implemented throughout the 
supply chain – from the mine to final product manufacturing – in order for 
disclosure to work.23 
Controversy in Washington is one thing.  The effect of section 1502 on the Congolese is 
quite another.  Although section 1502 has yet to be implemented, it has already had far-
reaching consequences, none of which involve a reduction in violence.  In September 2010, 
Congolese President Joseph Kabila instituted a ban on all mining in the Kivu and Maniema 
provinces.  This ban largely shut down mining activity in the region, but it also led to 
increased militarization of the mining sector as the Congolese national army, the FARDC, 
took over many mines that had previously been non-militarized.  While Kabila’s reasons for 
implementing the ban are unknown, it is obvious that the ban would not have happened had 
section 1502 not become law.  Mining in the Kivus is an activity from which many leading 
Congolese politicians financially benefit, as do members of the Congolese armed forces.  
Some in the advocacy community believe that Kabila instituted the six-month ban in order 
to make section 1502 fail, but this is an implausible claim in light of available evidence.  
Kabila faced a tight re-election battle in November 2011 and desperately needed the electoral 
support of communities most affected by his mining ban.  The ban put miners out of work, 
which is not exactly a promising electoral strategy.  The Congolese government claimed 
when they lifted the ban that it led to the disarmament of several militias.24  It is likely that 
this, rather than a conspiracy to undermine section 1502, is what drove Kabila’s decision.  
He saw a ban as a chance to persuade voters that he was engaging in constructive activities 
to improve the security situation in the east. Also, it is important to remember that access to 
eastern Congolese minerals is believed by most observers to be a key component in the 
rapprochement Kabila reached with Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame in 2009 to end 
hostilities between their countries.  Kabila’s mining ban apparently allowed the FARDC to 
consolidate control over some previously non-militarized mines (eg, at Kamituga), which 
may have been another goal – ensuring that his troops, not others, had control over the 
mines before 1502’s rules came into effect would be important if guaranteeing Rwanda 
access to Congolese minerals is part of maintaining the peace. 
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Kabila’s ban on mining ended in March 2011, but another de facto embargo of Congolese 
minerals soon took its place.  As the April 2011 deadline for the implementation of section 
1502 regulations approached, the Malaysia Smelting Corporation (MSC) began refusing to 
buy Congolese tin under pressure from industry watchdog group the Electronics Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (EICC).  The EICC created a tracing scheme for smelters that requires 
corporations to show their ores to be conflict free, and most companies were to work 
through a tin industry group called ITRI to ensure their minerals were appropriately tagged 
as being conflict-free.25 This tracing scheme went into effect on April 1, 2011.  However, 
MSC could not guarantee that all of its minerals would be ITRI-tagged and so stopped 
purchasing minerals from D.R. Congo.26  MSC had previously purchased up to 80% of 
eastern Congolese tin, so its exit from the market was devastating to local sellers.27 
The effect of MSC’s decision to exit the D.R. Congo mineral trade means that there is now a 
de facto boycott on almost all Congolese tungsten, tantalum, and cassiterite.  North Kivu 
exports of tin, which is derived from cassiterite, have fallen by 90%.28  Only three of Goma’s 
25 exporters are operating, and they are selling minerals primarily to the Chinese.  These 
purchases may be illegal under a 2010 UN resolution requiring UN member states to urge 
their corporations not to purchase minerals that might be financing violence in the region, 
but this resolution seems to have had little effect.29   
Section 1502’s effect on Congolese artisanal miners and their families, however, has been 
devastating.30  Congolese artisanal miners normally work under horrific conditions for little 
pay,31 but in most mining communities, it is the only paid employment available.  There are 
no livelihoods alternatives, save subsistence agriculture or joining a militia.  Now they are in 
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trouble; as the World Bank PROMINES head Paul Yenga Mabolia told Bloomberg 
Businessweek, “Almost everything came to a standstill.”32 
Local civil society activists engaged in the mining sector estimate that 1-2 million Congolese 
artisanal miners and those who work in other aspects of the mining sector are currently out 
of work.  Multiplied by the 5-6 direct dependents that each miner has, section 1502 has 
inadvertently and directly negatively affected up to 5-12 million Congolese civilians.33 Many 
miners cannot feed their children, their children are not in school this year because they 
cannot pay tuition fees, and those who are ill cannot afford medical treatment.34  Many other 
miners have shifted to work in the gold sector, where smuggling is easy and sales continue.35 
That miners are out of work reverberates through the entire eastern Congolese economy.  
This situation was anticipated by Congolese civil society leaders and has been just as 
devastating as they feared.36  When miners lack earnings, not only can they not pay their 
children’s school fees or afford to visit health care professionals, but they do not have 
money to pay for other goods and services in the local markets, meaning that shopkeepers, 
hairdressers, seamstresses, and market sellers are also earning significantly less.   In many 
mining areas, economies were based partly on minerals rather than cash; it was possible to 
buy goods and services by trading a teaspoon of coltan for, say, school tuition.  In addition, 
planes that flew into remote mining areas like Shabunda and Walikale are no longer coming 
to take the minerals out.  Those planes carried in basic necessities like petroleum, salt, and 
candles to places that are not accessible by road.  Today, those communities must do 
without such necessities; even if one has money to purchase the goods, they are no longer 
available.   
The impact on mining sector livelihoods, while unintended, is a disaster for the already-
fragile economy of the eastern D.R. Congo.  Miners cannot provide for their families by 
returning to subsistence agriculture.  Policy makers must consider the real and immediate – 
albeit unintended – impact their actions have had on artisanal mining communities.  The 
potential for a humanitarian crisis is real; USAID and many non-governmental organizations 
are engaged in assessments in the region to determine how best to aid these miners. 
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Advocates anticipated that artisanal miners would be put out of work by legislation targeting 
Congolese conflict minerals.  HR 4128 contained provisions to provide assistance to mining 
communities.  However, section 1502 provides no such assistance.  Advocates have called 
for legislation to support miner livelihoods, but there is little money available for these 
programs.37  In any case, a fund to support miners is not a sustainable solution for their 
employment problems.  Even if $20 million were available to support miners, such funding 
is grossly inadequate to help communities faced with the need to rebuild their local 
economies from scratch.   If they are unable to work soon, the suffering of artisanal miners 
and their families will be compounded.   
The real tragedy of this situation is that while 1502 has inadvertently put entire Congolese 
communities out of work, they still live under the constant threat of violence and 
intimidation.  There has been no reduction in violence in the Kivu provinces as a result of 
the government-imposed or the international de facto bans.  Armed groups continue to 
terrorize local populations and to prey upon communities for food, money, and other 
resources.  Moreover, as the 2011 Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on Congo 
notes, the de facto ban has led to an increase in conflict mineral smuggling via Rwanda and 
pushed Congolese armed groups to seek alternate sources of revenue, including the timber 
trade, and, in the case of the FDLR, continuing involvement in trading cannabis and palm 
oil.38   Section 1502 has – albeit unintentionally – thus far caused more problems than it has 
solved. 
What went wrong? Advocacy misperceptions & the D.R. 
Congo conflict 
Advocates correctly argue that section 1502 has yet to be implemented, and many seem to 
believe that this absolves them of responsibility for the consequences described above.  This 
is a disingenuous argument.  Neither Kabila’s ban or the MSC’s decision to stop buying 
Congolese minerals would have happened had Dodd-Frank not become law.  Both the 
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timing of the actual and de facto bans and all rhetoric surrounding them suggests that these 
were clear responses to the perceived future effects of the legislation.  MSC and other 
international buyers are not purchasing Congolese minerals due to uncertainty about the 
SEC regulations on Section 1502.39  That the consequences were unintentional and 
unanticipated does not mean they were not direct effects of 1502’s passage. 
While the U.S.-based advocacy community working on D.R. Congo has good intentions 
with regards to wanting to improve the quality of life for the Congolese, most advocates 
made several key mistakes in their analysis of the situation.  These mistakes were based on 
misperceptions – most notably about the relationship between mineral exploitation and 
conflict in the Congo, the drivers of Congolese armed group behavior, and the feasibility of 
running effective traceability schemes in a failed state.  What did the advocates get wrong? 
Minerals don’t cause conflict in Congo 
Efforts to pass legislation on conflict minerals in the D.R. Congo were based on the 
mistaken assumption that because the mineral trade is one dynamic in some of the region’s 
conflicts, this means that minerals cause conflict.  This underlying belief can be seen in a 
number of early advocacy efforts such as Enough’s April 2009 strategy paper, “Can You 
Hear Congo Now?” As criticism of this claim mounted, advocates moderated their language 
to refer to conflict minerals as a “key driver” of conflict in the eastern D.R. Congo.  
However, this claim is also misleading.  If minerals cause or drive conflict in a failed state, 
then we would expect to see most, if not all, of the Congolese mineral trade to be militarized 
and/or the object of competition between armed groups.  This is far from true, however.  
The mines of Kasai and central Katanga are completely free of violence, as are many mines 
in the heart of the conflict regions in North and South Kivu and Ituri.40  Another dynamic is 
at work in the Kivus, and it has very little to do with the mineral trade, but is instead about 
the state’s weakness and local disputes over land and citizenship rights.  As analyst Jason 
Stearns told AlertNet, “There is no doubt that minerals constitute a large part of the conflict 
economy in the eastern Congo and dealing with the conflict minerals issue is important, 
…But minerals were not the origin of the conflict in Congo and solving the conflict minerals 
issue is not going to bring an end to the conflicts.”41 The militarized mineral trade is much 
more a symptom of the Congolese state’s weakness and inability to govern than it is its 
cause.   
                                                       
39 Jonny Hogg and Graham Holliday, “Conflict minerals crackdown backfiring in Congo.” Reuters (30 
December 2011). Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL6E7NU25720111230?sp=true 
40 One particularly egregious example of misleading claims about the Congolese mineral sector came in a 
segment of CBS’s 60 Minutes, in which John Prendergast and CBS correspondent Scott Pelley traveled to Ituri’s 
Chudja gold mine for a 2009 segment.  Ituri gold mines have been at peace since 2006, but the Chudja mine was 
presented in the segment as a place in which violence against civilians was actively occurring.  See Scott Pelley, 
“Congo’s Gold.” 60 Minutes (29 November 2009). Available: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5825990n  
41 George Fominyen, “Mineral certification? The path to end Congo’s violence?” AlertNet. (6 May 2011). 
Available: http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/mineral-certification-the-path-to-end-congos-violence/   
 
Armed groups don’t fight because they have access to mineral wealth 
The logic behind focusing on the mineral trade as a way to slow violence in the eastern D.R. 
Congo is as follows:   
1.  Armed groups maintain control of mines so that they can earn money to fuel their 
activities.   
2.  If international and local actors cut off armed groups’ access to mineral wealth by 
implementing traceability schemes and responsible sourcing mechanisms, armed 
groups will no longer be able to earn as much money.  
3.  Therefore, the ability of armed groups to fight and/or terrorize Congolese civilians 
will be diminished.   
While this logic sounds good on paper, it is based on a misperception of what motivates 
Congolese armed groups and what they do with the money they earn from the mines.  First, 
there is little reason to believe that Congolese armed groups use the bulk of the money they 
earn from the mineral trade to buy weapons and ammunition.  The eastern D.R. Congo is 
saturated with weapons; few soldiers need to buy new ones, and those that are for sale are 
extremely inexpensive and readily available in local markets.42  
Instead, most of the money earned by armed groups from the mineral trade is used to pay 
salaries, buy food, and provide other basic necessities to fighters and their families.  This is 
particularly true in the FARDC, where government salaries are rarely paid and when soldiers 
do receive money, it is often only a partial salary.  Even if soldiers are paid their salary, the 
amount (approximately $40-50/month) is far below what is needed to provide for their 
families.  Thus they look to earn revenue via the mineral trade.   
Second, even if armed groups do depend on the mineral trade to finance their activities, 
most can draw upon other reliable sources of revenue.  As Vlassenroot and Adam have 
shown, Congolese civilians face an enormous burden from informal taxation schemes, many 
of which are carried out by armed groups.43  Reliance on the mineral trade varies widely 
among Congolese armed groups, with the FDLR earning as much as 75% of its revenue 
from the mineral trade (mostly from gold), while others like the CNDP earn significantly 
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less.44  In addition to the mineral trade, Congolese armed groups rely on taxation of citizens 
under their control, of revenues collected at roadblocks, and on trade in other commodities 
like charcoal, timber, and bananas. As access to mineral wealth has been limited, Congolese 
armed groups have turned to other forms of revenue extraction with little effect on their 
violent behavior. 
Third, most Congolese armed groups are not motivated to fight by the mineral trade or for 
access to the mines; instead, their violent behavior stems from anger over inequality, 
ideological issues, and/or because there are no constraints on such activities in the eastern 
D.R. Congo.  As Séverine Autesserre notes, despite the international community’s 
overwhelming focus on conflict minerals, only about 8% of Congolese conflicts are over 
natural resources.45  Some groups, including many of the Mai Mai militias, fight simply 
because they can.  Others have specific grievances about their ethnic groups’ position in 
society or, in the case of the FDLR, about the Rwandan political leadership.  With regard to 
none of the armed groups of eastern Congo is there any evidence that they will stop fighting 
simply because they lose a key source of revenue.  The loss of revenue is not likely to affect 
their ability to procure weapons and ammunition, nor is it likely to motivate them to 
negotiate for peace.  Instead, they are likely to prey on civilians to an even greater extent 
than before the de facto mining boycott went into effect.   
Traceability is very challenging in a fragile state 
The idea of ensuring that Congolese conflict-free minerals can make it to market is an 
attractive one.  Unfortunately, it is based on a poor understanding of how trade and 
governance works in an extremely weak state.  The idea for implementing a traceability 
scheme with respect to the D.R. Congo was based on the Kimberley Process for ensuring 
that diamonds sold on international markets would be conflict free.  However, advocates 
failed to take into account that the Kimberley Process only works well in relatively strong 
states with functioning governing institutions.   
The situation in the eastern D.R. Congo could not be further from the norm.  It is not an 
exaggeration to say that it is possible to bribe almost every border guard, customs official, 
and immigration authority in the region.  These officials are not paid regular salaries and are 
dependent on money they can raise through bribery and the imposition of made-up fees to 
provide for their livelihoods.  This makes smuggling very easy; indeed, it is obvious that a 
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great deal of smuggling is happening even as the de facto boycott continues.  Border officials 
intercepted a load of cassiterite in a MONUSCO vehicle in August, but it is likely that the 
ton they caught there is but a small fraction of what is being smuggled out.46  Smuggling has 
greatly increased since the de facto boycott went into effect, and it seems likely to continue 
into the future regardless of whether the SEC adopts rules or not.47 
It is very difficult to see how any traceability scheme could overcome this situation, for it is 
not only officials at the borders who will take bribes, but also those at airports and at the 
mines themselves.  An effective traceability scheme would have to involve implementation 
and monitoring at every step of the process, including transport, by disinterested outside 
observers who cannot be bought.  But even this may be problematic as anyone familiar with 
the Congolese spirit of innovation and entrepreneurial ingenuity expects that smugglers will 
find a way to fake certification before too long.  Without effective oversight from 
functioning government institutions, it is unlikely that even the most carefully planned 
traceability scheme will effectively prevent conflict minerals from being sold on international 
markets.   
Traceability schemes were already being developed prior to section 1502’s 
passage 
Many who supported Dodd-Frank section 1502 made it sound as though it would be the 
first traceability scheme to address the problems in the Congolese mining sector.  This is 
simply untrue.  A number of efforts were underway, and many of these were undertaken in 
consultation with local civil society leaders and Congolese mineral trade exports.  In 
particular, an effort called PROMINES involving the Congolese government, the World 
Bank, and industry had made great strides towards improving transparency and 
accountability.  This effort was out of the public eye and intentionally low-key and had great 
potential for success. However, it and other ongoing efforts (most notably the International 
Conference for the Great Lakes Region’s RINR framework48) to improve the sector have 
largely ignored and/or confused with the mess surrounding section 1502.  Currently, the 
ICGLR, the ITRI, the OECD, and the SEC are all pursuing traceability regulations and 
schemes, sometimes in consultation with one another and sometimes without doing so.  
Other schemes include MONUSCO’s creation of trading centers, an EITI scheme, and the 
German government’s BGR program.  The problem is compounded in that traceability is 
possible with some commodities (eg, diamonds), but extraordinarily difficult with others 
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(namely, gold).  In short, there is a great deal of confusion surrounding the issue and a 
desperate need for more collaboration.49   
Regional stability and the mineral trade 
The mineral trade in the Congo is a regional issue, not simply a local one.50  Violence has 
substantially decreased in the Kivu provinces since early 2009. While the situation in the 
region is still very volatile in places, the overall situation is vastly improved from what it was 
during the transition period and in the first years after the 2006 elections.  A major reason 
for this stability is the rapprochement between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame.  In late 2008 and early 2009, CNDP troops (widely 
believed to be financially backed by the government of Rwanda) were on the brink of taking 
control of Goma, which could not be held by the limited number of MONUC peacekeepers 
posted there.  However, Rwanda stopped the CNDP, arrested its leader Laurent Nkunda, 
and within months, Kabila and Kagame reached an agreement.  This agreement was 
negotiated by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, acting on behalf of the United 
Nations.  It is an oral agreement and its specific contents are only fully known to the two 
heads of state.  Most observers believe that the agreement contained some kind of provision 
that guaranteed Rwanda access to Congolese minerals, an important source of revenue for 
Rwanda.   
Rwanda has been careful to voice its support for mineral tracing schemes in the D.R. Congo 
and recently announced its intention to return 70 tons of smuggled, untagged minerals to the 
Congolese.51  However, it is unclear whether Rwanda has been rejecting all smuggled 
minerals from the D.R. Congo.  Rwanda has very limited mineral reserves in its own 
territory; most minerals sold on world markets as “Rwandan” are actually Congolese.   
Rwanda is very careful to maintain its public image as an international good citizen and so 
the government is unlikely to protest the implementation of section 1502 or other legislation.  
However, it is important that Rwanda be able to maintain access to Congolese minerals in 
the interest of regional stability.  It does not seem feasible that Rwanda would re-invade 
Congo to gain access to minerals, but it is within the realm of possibility that Rwanda would 
turn to secretly back a local militia if it felt its economic interests would be best served by 
doing so.   
Why did advocates fall prey to these misperceptions?  While it is impossible to know for 
certain, it is clear that many of those who conceived the strategy for dealing with conflict 
minerals either had direct experience working to put together the Kimberley Process or were 
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inspired by its efforts.  This is particularly true with respect to advocates from British 
organization Global Witness, which focuses on minerals in conflict and played a major role 
in developing the Kimberley Process.   
The Enough Project took matters a step further as they repeatedly cited the efforts leading 
to the creation of Kimberley Process as instrumental in ending conflicts in countries that 
house significant diamond reserves.52  For example, Enough’s John Prendergast and Aaron 
Hall argued in a February 2011 op-ed that, “The global blood diamonds movement helped 
to end these wars, and the resulting Kimberley Process, although far from perfect, has 
helped to consolidate peace in those areas, playing a significant role in ending conflict in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola.”53 
It is true that the Kimberley Process was created largely in response to the conflicts in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Angola, where the sale of “blood diamonds” were a major revenue 
source for the countries’ armed factions.  However, it is empirically false to say that the 
Sierra Leonean, Liberian, and Angolan wars ended due to the Kimberley Process and its 
potential effect on mineral revenue for armed groups.  The Sierra Leone conflict ended after 
a stalemate developed between the RUF and government forces.54  As J. Peter Pham notes, 
“the brutal tactics employed by the rebels as well as their lack of a coherent political program 
other than to overthrow the national government in Freetown rendered it difficult for them 
to rally Sierra Leoneans to their cause.”  Peace was restored in 2001-02 through a security-
restoration process in which the UN peacekeeping mission UNAMSIL’s force strength grew 
to 17,500 and was mandated to support government efforts to disarm combatants and 
restore order.55   
Likewise, the Angola conflict ended not because the Kimberley Process cut off revenues to 
rebel fighters, but rather because UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in combat in 
2002 and his successors agreed to a ceasefire less than two months later.  The ceasefire led to 
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Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 129:6 (Winter/Spring 2005), 129-147.  
 
a political process by which UNITA soldiers disarmed and the movement became a political 
party.56  In Liberia, the country’s second civil war ended in 2003 because the LURD rebel 
movement attained a series of battlefield victories over Charles Taylor, the primary 
beneficiary of the Sierra Leonean diamond trade, and declared a ceasefire in the face of 
international diplomatic pressure that led Taylor to resign.   
With the exception of Liberia, none of the wars cited by advocates as support for the idea 
that creating a mineral supply chain traceability scheme will reduce conflict had ended by the 
time the Kimberley Process came into effect.  There is no evidence that suggests fighters in 
any of these conflicts were primarily – or at all – motivated to lay down their arms due to the 
fear that they might lose sources of revenue from the diamond trade.  Instead, decisive 
battlefield victories, external pressure, and negotiated political solutions were what ended 
each conflict.   
Creating an International Norm 
That the Kimberley Process did not end the wars in Sierra Leone or Angola is not in and of 
itself a reason not to pursue traceability schemes and responsible sourcing for other mineral 
resources in conflict areas.  If implemented well, they can theoretically build more 
accountable and transparent economies in countries that need them.  For some advocates 
who supported Dodd-Frank sections 1502 and 1504, the creation of such an international 
norm is by far the most important aspect of the legislation, arguably more so than whether 
the law will lead to greater peace and stability in the eastern Congo.  These advocates see the 
potential failure of the law as disastrous for their goal of building international norms to hold 
corporations responsible for where and how they source materials for their products.   
While there is no question that all D.R. Congo stakeholders want to see less violence and 
more peace and prosperity in the conflict regions, the overarching focus on the creation of a 
norm with respect to conflict minerals is problematic.  Advocates used the horrific nature of 
the violence in the D.R. Congo to draw attention to the crisis and leveraged emotional 
language, images, and testimony about rape in the Congo to promote the need for legislation 
on conflict minerals while promising that the violence would abate if the legislation were 
passed. However, many overstated the potential that a traceability and transparency scheme 
would have for alleviating some of that violence.  Meanwhile, the unintended effects of the 
passage of section 1502 have put millions of Congolese artisanal miners out of work, and the 
violence has not abated despite the fact that few armed groups are making money from the 
nearly-halted mineral trade.  Many policy makers and legislators feel as though they have 
been deceived as to what consequences – positive and negative – section 1502 would 
produce, particularly with respect to preventing civilian-directed violence.   
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As noted above, the notion that governments and consumers should hold corporations 
accountable for responsibly sourcing materials and labor used to build their products should 
not be controversial.  Many consumers have shown that they prefer to pay higher prices for 
fair trade and ethically-produced goods.  However, we need to decouple the value of creating 
a norm about supply chain tracing from the notion that doing so will end violence against 
Congolese civilians.  There is no evidence that supply chain tracing schemes end conflict or 
prevent violence, and however Dodd-Frank section 1502 is implemented, it is unlikely that 
this law will do so in the D.R. Congo.  Violence in the Congo is rooted in political disputes 
and requires a political solution, not an economic one.  Stakeholders could have a more 
productive and honest debate by delinking these issues and focusing on finding appropriate 
solutions to distinct problems.   
Recommendations 
What can be done to improve the plight of Congolese artisanal miners while simultaneously 
promoting a more transparent and legitimate mining sector?  The following 
recommendations seek to address the problem by slowing down the implementation 
process, focusing on miner livelihoods, and incorporating local solutions. 
1.  Implement Dodd-Frank section 1502 in phases with clear annual 
benchmarks over three years.   
The U.S. advocacy community strongly believes that section 1502 should be immediately 
implemented and that the SEC should issue rules on the Congo mining sector without 
further delay.57  Enough has created a Step Up for 1502 campaign through which its 
grassroots activists are pressuring the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to back down from their 
plans for a lawsuit and through which they are urging the SEC to act immediately.58    
Congolese civil society leaders and mining sector officials, however, believe that by slowing 
down the implementation of section 1502 it will be possible to integrate the many existing 
schemes for improving transparency and accountability in the Congo mining sector.  They 
are correct; as the SEC regulations are one set among many, the differences in traceability 
schemes has produced mass confusion while creating no as-yet-viable process for tagging 
and tracing Congolese minerals.  By slowing the timeline on implementation of the SEC 
rules and allowing for a three year transitional period, more time will be available for a 
consultative process that integrates the interests of Congolese miners along with industry 
and advocacy interests.  It also makes the success of a traceability scheme more likely; with 
buy-in from local actors, the likelihood of smuggling will significantly decrease. 
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The SEC should develop a series of clear benchmarks for each year of the transitional 
implementation process for section 1502.  It is unrealistic to assume that effective and 
transparent traceability schemes can be implemented in D.R. Congo overnight.  Benchmarks 
should be progressively stronger and should be realistic. They should also take into account 
local civil society actors’ views on what is and is not feasible, and should be centered on 
building community consensus about the regulations and the need for a traceability scheme.   
Furthermore, the goals should work to integrate and unite the many existing traceability 
schemes into one workable system.  Goals for the first year should be primarily focused on 
public education and the creation of basic infrastructure for the system.  Over the second 
and third years, rules should require progressively higher standards for conflict-free 
purchases.  The SEC should reasonably expect that companies can report that about 25% of 
their mineral exports from D.R. Congo are conflict-free at the end of year one, with that 
number rising to 50% by the end of year two and 100% by the end of year three.  
Regulations regarding reporting and auditing of non-conflict-free minerals should not fully 
go into effect until after the end of the third year. 
2.  Provide immediate assistance to affected mining communities. 
Congolese miners affected by the de facto ban on mineral exports need immediate, short-term 
assistance for basic necessities, school fees, and health care.  This assistance need not be 
terribly costly; allocating approximately $50-$150 per family dependent on family size would 
help to alleviate their most pressing problems.  Foremost among these concerns are the 
ability to purchase food and to pay school fees.  For basic needs, families need food aid.  
However, given that section 1502 has shut down much of the economy in mining regions, 
aid agencies should consider disbursing aid in the form of direct cash transfers to affected 
families.  This would allow them to buy food from local providers, thereby helping the 
Kivutian economy to recover.  Assistance should also be provided to the already-stretched 
health care system.  If miners are not given direct cash transfers to pay for health care on 
their own, then donors and aid agencies should temporarily subsidize the full cost of health 
care.  Out-of-pocket health care expenses in the region range from about $1 to $5 for most 
visits and overnight hospital stays, so the cost of temporarily fully subsidizing health care 
would not be extraordinarily high.   
The Congolese school year operates on a trimester system and began in early September, but 
most miners were unable to pay their children’s tuition, which ranges from $5/trimester for 
primary school to $15-30/trimester for secondary school.  Aid agencies normally do not pay 
school fees, but in this case, an exception should be made.  Payments for miners’ children’s 
tuition should be made directly to education providers, which in most cases are religious 
institutions managing the public schools on behalf of the state.  Doing so would allow 
school officials to pay teachers’ and administrator’s salaries, thereby further helping to 
jumpstart the local economy and support those who are indirectly affected by the de facto 
embargo.   
    
 
3.  Turn traceability into a jobs program. 
There is a small chance that delaying the implementation of section 1502 would allow 
Congolese artisanal miners to get back to work while traceability schemes are developed in a 
more collaborative process.  Industry watchdog groups and industrial coalitions should 
consider allowing corporations to buy Congolese minerals while meeting yearly benchmarks 
to show improvement.  This would help the people of the eastern Congo immeasurably 
while still showing a commitment to transparency and accountability in the mineral sector.  
As benchmarks are achieved over time, it could also create better working conditions and 
improve quality of life for miners.   
However, the professionalization of the mining sector is likely to put many artisanal miners 
out of work, and it is not clear that industry watchdogs would allow companies to buy 
Congolese minerals under transitional conditions.  The traceability scheme that is ultimately 
developed should include job creation efforts as part of its structure; there is no reason that 
former miners should not be hired as taggers or hold other positions to ensure that minerals 
are certified as conflict-free.   
The international community should increase its emphasis on job creation schemes in the 
Congolese mining regions as well by implementing microcredit programs, investing in 
rebuilding infrastructure, and through other job-creation efforts.  Mining jobs should be one 
economic opportunity among many.   
4.  Create formal mechanisms for Congolese leadership in the 
implementation process. 
A major problem with U.S.-based advocacy efforts on the Congo is that their major strategy 
was conceived in Washington with little to no reference to Congolese actors and their 
concerns.  Local actors that were drawn into the process in its later stages tended to be 
hand-picked supporters of the process, while dissenting voices were left out.  As it stands 
now, many Congolese experts on the mining sector are marginalized in the debate and have 
little incentive to work with advocates and policy makers who previously ignored them.   
Many of the problems with section 1502 and its unintended consequences were anticipated 
by Congolese civil society leaders and scholars and could have been avoided had their 
perspectives been integrated in the advocacy process before strategies were released and 
advocacy activities had already been determined.  Allowing Congolese leaders to have a 
formal role in the implementation process, as well as listening to local leaders on what needs 
to be done to combat regional violence will increase buy-in for traceability schemes, thus 
contributing to a decline in smuggling and public support for the new rules.    
 
Any such mechanism should include a wide spectrum of Congolese civil society actors, not 
just those known to support 1502 or those selected only by Western advocacy coalitions.59  
Doing so will ensure that effective compromises reflecting the reality of state fragility and 
the practicality of implementation schemes on the ground in eastern D.R. Congo. 
5.  Focus on security sector reform as a distinct issue. 
The D.R. Congo advocacy community has increased its focus on security sector reform in 
recent months.60 This is a welcome development and one that should continue.   As the 
militarized mineral trade in D.R. Congo is a symptom rather than a cause of violence, policy 
makers, advocates, and commentators should make an effort to discuss security sector 
reform as a distinct issue from the mineral trade.  Improving transparency and accountability 
in the mineral trade should be understood as an economic solution to an economic problem. 
Doing so will help to clarify solutions in the mineral sector – particularly with respect to 
what to do about the gold trade61 – while allowing for a more clearheaded discussion of the 
difficult tasks that lie ahead.  These tasks include training and professionalizing the FARDC, 
restoring territorial authority, and disarming rebel factions.  The U.S. government should 
expand its efforts via AFRICOM, particularly with respect to FARDC training and 
professionalization programs. 
Conclusion 
While the debate over Dodd-Frank section 1502 is contentious, all stakeholders share the 
goal of improving the quality of life and security situation of the Congolese people, 
particularly miners and their families.  With this common basis of concern, stakeholders can 
and must find ways to work together to implement traceability and accountability schemes. 
However, these schemes must be realistic and based on a factual understanding of how the 
mineral trade in eastern Congo actually works as well as the limits imposed by an extremely 
weak state and the ease of smuggling under such conditions.  In particular, advocates and 
legislators must understand that cleaning up the mineral trade in eastern Congo – while 
necessary and important – is unlikely to alleviate violence there.  Only political solutions and 
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a strong commitment to security sector reform will produce a lasting peace that enables the 
Congolese to benefit from their country’s rich natural resources.   
It is not too late to correct some of the unintended consequences of Dodd-Frank section 
1502. By slowing the implementation process and allowing Congolese civil society voices to 
lead, the SEC can allow time to develop more realistic and feasible solutions to the problem.  
At the international level, the OECD and other groups developing similar regulations can 
learn from the mistakes of 1502 while pushing for political solutions to D.R. Congo’s 
political violence.   